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SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION:
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT PREVENT A SEARCH
OF PASSENGERS' CONTAINERS IN AN AUTOMOBILE
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999)
I. FACTS
On the morning of July 23, 1995, Officer Delane Baldwin of the
Wyoming Highway Patrol stopped a car for speeding and driving with a
faulty brake light.1 The car contained three people: the driver, David
Young; Young's girlfriend; and Respondent, Sandra Houghton. 2 As
Officer Baldwin approached the car, he noticed a hypodermic syringe
visible in Young's shirt pocket. 3 Officer Baldwin asked Young why he
had the syringe, and Young, with "refreshing candor," replied that he
used the syringe to take drugs. 4
At this point, Officer Baldwin and the other officers at the scene
ordered all the occupants out of the car. 5 While Officer Baldwin
searched the car, the additional officers asked the passengers their
names. 6 Baldwin found a purse on the back seat, and Houghton claimed
it was hers.7 Inside the purse, the officer found a wallet, a brown pouch,
and a black wallet-type item. 8 The wallet contained Houghton's driver's
license, which correctly identified her as Sandra Houghton. 9 The brown
pouch contained drug paraphernalia and a syringe with methampheta-
mine. 10 The black wallet-type item contained drug paraphernalia and a
syringe with methamphetamine. 11 Houghton admitted that the wallet
containing her identification and the black wallet-type item belonged to
1. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 297 (1999); Petitioner's Brief at 2, Houghton (No.
98-184).
2. See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 298; see also Petitioner's Brief at 2, Houghton (No. 98-184). The
Petitioner's Brief stated that all the occupants were in the front seat of the car, and Houghton was
seated closest to the passenger door. See Petitioner's Brief at 2, Houghton (No. 98-184).
3. See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 298.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id. Houghton falsely identified herself as "Sandra James." See id. She later explained
that she did this in case "things went bad." See id.
7. See id. According to Petitioner's Brief, Houghton left her purse on the back seat of the car,
and none of the officers told her to leave it there. See Petitioner's Brief at 2-3, Houghton (No.
98-184). The Amicus Brief submitted by the United States added that the purse was found near the
middle of the back seat, a little closer to the driver's side than the passenger's side. See United States
Amicus Brief at 2-3, Houghton (No. 98-184).
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her.12 However, she denied the brown pouch was hers and stated she had
no idea how it got into her purse.13
As a result of the information obtained from the search of her purse
and the observation of fresh needle track marks on her arms, Houghton
was placed under arrest. 14 Houghton was the only person charged or
arrested at the scene; the driver and the other passenger were released.15
The State of Wyoming charged Houghton with felony possession of
methamphetamine. 16 Houghton moved to suppress the evidence ob-
tained from the search of her purse as the fruits of an illegal search.17
The trial court held that there was probable cause to merit the search, and
it admitted the evidence using the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement.1 8 Houghton was convicted of felony possession of a
controlled substance. 19 Houghton appealed her case to the Wyoming
Supreme Court. 20
The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the search violated the
Fourth Amendment. 2 1 The Wyoming Supreme Court articulated a rule
requiring officers to determine the ownership of items within an auto-
mobile. 22 Once ownership was determined, the officers would be allowed
to search only the belongings of the persons as to whom there was
suspicion of criminal activity. 23 As a result, Houghton's conviction was
reversed. 24
The State of Wyoming then appealed to the United States Supreme
Court. 25 The State of Wyoming stated the issue as: whether the auto-
mobile exception to the Fourth Amendment allowed law enforcement
officials to search a passenger's personal belongings, located inside the
passenger compartment of a lawfully stopped vehicle, when there is
12. See id. The amount of methamphetamine found in the black wallet-type item was not enough
for a felony charge. See id. For a felony charge of liquid methamphetamine, the amount must be
greater than three-tenths of a gram; the black wallet-type item contained only 10 ccs of
methamphetamine. See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-7-1031(c)(i)(B), (c)(iii) (Michie 1999); Houghton, 526
U.S. at 298.
13. See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 298. The brown pouch contained 60 ccs of methamphetamine,
enough for a felony charge. See id; see also Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-7-1031(c)(i)(B), (c)(iii) (Michie
1999).
14. See id.
15. See Petitioner's Brief at 3, Houghton (No. 98-184); see also United States Amicus Brief at 3,
Houghton (No. 98-184).
16. See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 298; see also Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-7-1031(c)(iii) (Supp. 1996).
17. See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 298-99.
18. See id. at 299.
19. See id.
20. See State v. Houghton, 956 P.2d 363 (Wyo. 1998).







probable cause to allow a search of the automobile, but there is no
probable cause specific to the passenger. 26 The United States Supreme
Court held that "officers with probable cause to search a car may inspect
passengers' belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing
the object of the search." 27
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The law of search and seizure is guided by the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated and no [w]arrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by [o]ath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.28
The Fourth Amendment was a reaction to the intrusiveness of
general warrants and searches without warrants, which were frequent in
pre-Revolutionary America. 29 The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is
to protect individuals from unwarranted invasions of their privacy
interests .30
One such protection the United States Supreme Court has im-
plemented is that "searches of private property be performed pursuant
to a search warrant." 31 Originally, searches conducted outside the war-
rant process were considered per se unreasonable. 32 Thus, it was unusual
for law enforcement officials to perform warrantless searches of private
property.33
However, the Court has created an exception for warrantless search-
es of automobiles, and thus, warrantless searches of automobiles are com-
mon occurrences. 34 Over time, the Court has proffered two justifications
for this exception. 35 First, the mobility of automobiles usually makes it
impracticable to obtain a warrant for an automobile in advance of a
26. See Petitioner's Brief at 8, Houghton (No. 98-184).
27. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 307.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
29. See Catherine A. Shepard, Comment, Search and Seizure: From Carroll to Ross, the Odyssey
of the Automobile Exception, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 221, 221 (1982).
30. See id.
31. Lewis R. Katz, Automobile Searches and Diminished Expectations in the Warrant Clause, 19
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 557, 559 (1982) (citing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 758 (1979)).
32. See id. at 559 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
33. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 7.2
(3d ed. 1996) (stating that lawful warrantless searches were unusual events).
34. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2.
35. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2.
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search. 36 Second, in the hierarchy of protection, the Fourth Amendment
does not provide as much protection for an automobile as it does for a
home or other premises because there is a diminished expectation of pri-
vacy in automobiles. 37 Each justification has been developed and de-
fined through case law involving the automobile exception to the Fourth
Amendment. 38
A. THE BEGINNING-CARROLL V. UNITED STATES
The United States Supreme Court first encountered the question of
a warrantless automobile search in a 1925 prohibition-era case. 39 In
Carroll v. United States,40 federal prohibition agents stopped two known
bootleggers after the agents recognized the bootleggers' automobile. 4'
The agents searched the car and found sixty-eight bottles of alcohol
hidden behind the upholstery of the back seat of the car. 42 The Court
found the search reasonable. 43 The Court held that searches and seizures
without a warrant are valid when made upon probable cause with a belief
that an automobile or other vehicle contains contraband. 44
The Court in Carroll began by examining legislation from the
founding era. 45 This legislation empowered governmental officials to
search any ship or vessel without a warrant if they had probable cause to
believe it contained goods subject to a duty. 46 The Carroll Court also
36. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2. This impracticability stems from the fact that "the vehicle
can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought." LAFAVE,
supra note 33, §7.2(a), at 459-60 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925)).
37. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2.
38. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-92 (1985); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590
(1974); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153
(1925).
39. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2(a), at 459 (citing Carroll, 267 U.S. 132).
40. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
41. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 135-36. The prohibition agents knew the bootleggers through
previous contact and knew the automobile driven by them because of the license plate on the
Oldsmobile roadster. See id.
42. See id. at 136.
43. See id at 162.
44. See id. The Court stated "[t]he Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was
deemed an unreasonable search and seizure [at the time the Amendment] was adopted" and the "true
rule," based upon reason and authority, was that searches and seizures based on probable cause were
valid. Id. at 149.
45. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 150-5 1.
46. See id. The Carroll case cited the actions of the 1789 Congress which provided:
[T]hat every collector, naval officer and surveyor, or other person specially appointed
by either of them for that purpose, shall have full power and authority, to enter any ship
or vessel, in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise
subject to duty shall be concealed; and therein to search for, seize, and secure any such
goods, wares or merchandise; and if they shall have cause to suspect a concealment
thereof, in any particular dwelling-house, store, building, or other place, they or either of
them shall, upon application on oath or affirmation to any justice of the peace, be entitled
to a warrant to enter such house, store, or other place (in the daytime only) and there to
946
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looked to Justice Bradley's 1886 opinion in Boyd v. United States,47
which distinguished contraband from other items.4 8 Justice Bradley ex-
plained that there was a distinction between the search and seizure of
contraband and the search and seizure of private books and papers.4 9
The Court reasoned that the government was authorized to seize stolen
goods or contraband, but the Fourth Amendment prohibited the govern-
ment from performing an unreasonable search of a person's private
books and papers for use in a criminal prosecution.50 In Boyd, Justice
Bradley therefore concluded that the search and seizure of contraband
was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 51
While the specificity to "contraband" seemed to be an important
part of the Carroll Court's justification for the warrantless search, 52 some
commentators thought the importance of classifying the object of the
search as contraband was diminished by the reference later in the opin-
ion to the practicality of obtaining a warrant. 53 In his treatise on the
Fourth Amendment, Professor Wayne LaFave noted that the Court
diminished the importance of contraband by suggesting that if it were
practical to obtain a warrant, the same search must be conducted with a
warrant.54 LaFave further stated that a warrantless search of an automo-
bile for more than contraband would appear to be allowed if it were
impracticable to secure a warrant. 55 Consequently, LaFave determined
that the Carroll Court began with what appeared to be a bright-line rule,
that a warrantless search for contraband within an automobile was
permissible, and then blurred the line by including the secondary issue,
the practicality of obtaining a warrant.56
Next, the Carroll Court addressed the issue of an automobile's
mobility by noting the difference between a search of a store, dwelling
house, or other structure and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon, or
search for such goods, and if any shall be found, to seize and secure the same for trial;
and all such goods, wares and merchandise, on which the duties shall not have been paid
or secured, shall be forfeited.
Id. (quoting Act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat. 29, 43).
47. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
48. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149-50 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886)). In
Boyd, the Court required the defendant to produce documentary evidence that the prosecution wanted
to use against him. See 116 U.S. at 618.
49. See id. at 623 (stating that the government was entitled to seize contraband, but it was not
entitled to seize private books or papers).
50. See id. The Boyd Court established that when there is probable cause, the search and seizure
is valid but that when securing a warrant is practicable, the government must secure a warrant. See
id.
51. See id. (basing the decision upon the fact that the government was allowed, through statute, to
seize the contraband).
52. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 156.
53. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2(a), at 460.
54. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2(a), at 460.
55. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2(a), at 460.
56. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2(a), at 460.
2000] 947
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automobile. 57 The Court recognized the problems inherent in the latter
category of items because they may easily be moved to another location,
such as to a location outside the jurisdiction where a warrant could be
issued. 58 The Court thus concluded that it was impractical to require a
warrant when searching moveable objects.59
The Carroll Court went on to specify that the right to search was not
contingent upon the right to arrest the occupants of the automobile, but
rather, it was based upon probable cause to believe that there was contra-
band within the automobile. 60 Because the officers in Carroll did not
have a lawful basis for taking the occupants of the automobile into
custody, 6 1 the officers presumably, did not have the authority to prevent
movement of the vehicle while they obtained a search warrant. 62 Thus,
the Court apparently determined that if there was probable cause to
search the car, the officers could not be faulted for failing to obtain a
warrant, because the officers had no authority to detain the occupants
and ensure the automobile was not moved. 63
For several years, Carroll was rarely utilized because searches of
automobiles "incident to arrest" allowed for a search of the entire
interior of a vehicle once the driver had been arrested. 64 This situation
changed after the Supreme Court's decision in Chimel v. California,65 in
which the scope of searches incident to arrest was limited to a search of
the arrestee and the area under the arrestee's immediate control. Thus, if
the arrestee was a driver, only the area in the vehicle under the driver's
immediate control would be within the scope of a valid search incident to
arrest.66
This limitation on searches incident to arrest began the "schizo-
phrenic roller coaster ride" the Supreme Court has taken in an effort to
57. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153; see also LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2(a), at 459.
58. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153. The Court acknowledged that it had made a "somewhat extend-
ed reference" to statutes recognizing the practical difficulties with obtaining a warrant for a moveable
place or things, and acknowledged that the differences were based on the practicability of warrantless
searches. Id.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 158-59. The Court rejected the defendants' argument that the seizure could only
be justified based upon a valid arrest and held the right to search and the validity of a search is
independent of the right to arrest. See id. at 157-58.
61. See id. at 160 (stating that the officers only had "reasonable cause" to believe the defendants
carried liquor in the car).
62. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2(a)(3), at 460.
63. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2(a)(3), at 460-61.
64. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2(a)(3), at 461 (citing the Harris-Rabinowitz rule, which
allowed the search of the entire interior of a vehicle once the driver was arrested).
65. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
66. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969). The Court in New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454 (1981), subsequently changed the scope of searches incident to arrest to include the
passenger compartment of the vehicle.
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advance legitimate law enforcement interests without allowing Fourth
Amendment protection for automobiles to disappear. 67 It was at this
point that the Carroll decision came to the forefront of the development
of the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement.68
B. EXPANSION OF CARROLL -Focus ON MOBILITY/EXIGENCY
The Supreme Court's first opportunity to determine the scope and
vitality of Carroll69 occurred in Chambers v. Maroney,70 a 1970 case.
The Court was faced with the question of whether Carroll could be used
to uphold the warrantless search of an automobile. 71 The automobile in
the Chambers case was seized and brought to the police station after the
arrest of all the occupants. 72 The Court refused to characterize the
search as incident to arrest because the police conducted the search some
time later.73
The Chambers Court permitted the warrantless search of the auto-
mobile after it had been seized and moved to another location. 74 The
Court spoke of the option between the seizure of the car until a warrant
was obtained and a search without a warrant as differing only in the
degree of intrusion upon a person's privacy. 75 The Chambers Court
stated that "[fWor constitutional purposes, we see no difference between
on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the proba-
ble cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an
immediate search without a warrant." 76 The key for the Chambers court
67. See Katz, supra note 31, at 563 (describing the Supreme Court cases since Carroll defining
the automobile exception).
68. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2(a), at 461.
69. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2(a), at 461 (noting "the continuing vitality and potential reach
of the Carroll doctrine suddenly became important" after Chimel because police officers could no
longer search the entire vehicle following a valid arrest).
70. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
71. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 50 (1970); LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2(a), at 461
(stating that the Court passed quickly on the claim that the search was incident to arrest primarily
because of the time lapse between the arrest and the search).
72. See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 44.
73. See id. at 47. The Chambers Court quoted Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964),
which held that "once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place,
without a warrant, is simply not incident to arrest."
74. See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51-52. The Carroll requirement of mobility was lessened by the
Chamber Court's approval of a search of an automobile after the automobile had been moved to the
station house. See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51-52. The Court further observed, in a footnote, that for
reasons of officer safety and to enable a careful search, it was not unreasonable to move the
automobile from the "dark parking lot" where the arrest was made "in the middle of the night." Id. at
52 n.10.
75. See id. at 52. The Court characterized the immobilization of the automobile while awaiting a
warrant as a "lesser" intrusion and the warrant as the "greater" intrusion. See id. at 5 1.
76. Id. at 52.
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was not the timing of the search, but the requirement of probable cause
to search.77
The Chambers decision has been criticized as being too broad
because the opinion seemed to eliminate the need for a warrant in all
automobile searches premised on probable cause.78 The reason the auto-
mobile's mobility received little attention in the Chambers case was
because the Court expanded the exception to cover the search of even an
immobile automobile. 79 Justices later disagreed about how to apply
Chambers because the decision could not be easily reconciled with the
requirement of exigent circumstances, such as mobility, in order for the
automobile exception to apply. 80
The importance of mobility was considered in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire,81 which was decided in 1971, one year after Chambers. In
Coolidge, police investigated the defendant for several weeks and,
subsequent to the defendant's arrest, seized his car in his driveway. 82
The Court held that the warrantless search of the car violated the Fourth
Amendment, 83 even though the search was made incident to arrest, 84 and
the search took place at the police station where the car had been
towed. 85
The facts were very similar to those in Chambers, but the Supreme
Court, in a plurality opinion, distinguished Coolidge from Chambers.86
In Coolidge, the police did not find any contraband in the car, 87 and the
car was not in motion when the police seized it; rather, the car was
77. See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52.
78. See Katz, supra note 31, at 567.
79. See Katz, supra note 31, at 565. Professor Katz described Chambers as the case that severed
the requirement of exigent circumstances from the automobile exception. See Katz, supra note 31, at
565. LaFave explained that the owner of the car in Chambers had been arrested along with the other
occupants. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2(a), at 463. Therefore, the owner was not in a position to
reclaim the car and move it. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2(a), at 463. Based on these facts,
LaFave argued that there were not any exigent circumstances, such as mobility, to justify the Court's
departure from the warrant requirement. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2(a), at 463.
80. See LAFAvE, supra note 33, § 7.2(a), at 463 (stating that the general rule was that the Court
required a search warrant for all searches unless there were exigent circumstances).
81. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
82. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1971). The police called a towing
company 2 1/2 hours after the arrest, and the car was searched two days after it was seized. See id.
It was searched again one year after the arrest and one last time three months after the previous
search. See id.
83. See id. at 463-64. The Court noted that the opportunity to search this car was not "fleeting,"
and thus, a search warrant should have been issued. See id. at 460.
84. See id. at 455.
85. See id at 456.
86. See id. at 458 (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 42 (1970)).
87. See id. at 448. The only evidence obtained from the search of the car was vacuum
sweepings containing particles of gunpowder. See id. In the Chambers case, the search of the car
revealed two guns, which the police considered contraband. See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 44.
950 [VOL. 76:943
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parked in the defendant's driveway. 88 The absence of contraband and
the immobility of the automobile prompted the Coolidge Court to
determine that the opportunity to search the car could not be character-
ized as "fleeting." 89 The Court stated that "no possible stretch of the
legal imagination" could construe this situation as one in which it was
impracticable to secure a warrant. 90 Thus, the application of the automo-
bile exception was improper.91
Application of Chambers in the wake of Coolidge further confused
courts as to what constituted mobility in the context of the automobile
exception. 92 In 1974, in Cardwell v. Lewis,93 the Court was faced with an
issue which was factually very different from other Fourth Amendment
cases the Court had considered because it involved the search of an
automobile's exterior.94 Law enforcement officials had made a warrant-
less seizure of Lewis' automobile from a public parking lot, and then the
officials removed the vehicle to a police impound-yard to examine the
exterior of the vehicle. 95 The police hoped to match paint scrapings
taken from a murder victim's car and tire tracks taken from the crime
scene in order to connect Lewis to the murder.96
The Court in Cardwell distinguished the case from Coolidge and
stated that Chambers was controlling. 97 The Court explained that this
case presented the similar problem with mobility of the vehicle. 98 In
fact, the concern with the car disappearing was more prevalent than it was
in Chambers since Lewis knew that his car was incriminating evidence. 99
While the Cardwell Court acknowledged that probable cause to
search and seize the car existed before Lewis was arrested, the Court held
88. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 447 (1971). Police officers stopped the car
in Chambers on a road about two miles from the scene of the crime. See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 44.
89. See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 460. The Court noted that after the arrest of Chambers, his wife
and children were escorted from the house and police stood guard at the house all night. See id.
90. See id. at 462 (citing Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153).
91. See id. at 463. The Court stated that even though the current situation concerned an auto-
mobile, an "'automobile' is not a talisman" which makes the Fourth Amendment disappear. See id. at
461.
92. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2(a), at 465.
93. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
94. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 585 (1974).
95. See id.
96. See id. at 595-96. The paint scrapings taken from the car matched those at the murder scene,
and the tire treads also matched those at the murder scene. See id. at 588.
97. See id. at 593 (stating that the "scope of the search" and the "circumstances of the seizure"
were different in Coolidge). The Court explained that the Coolidge case involved police entering
private property since the car was parked in the driveway. See id.
98. See id. at 594 (stating that the "same arguments and considerations of exigency, immobiliza-
tion on the spot, and posting a guard" applied in this case).
99. See id. at 595 (explaining that Lewis had been interrogated about the crime). Also, there was
testimony that Lewis had asked one of his attorneys to get the car to his wife and that the attorney
turned over the keys to "avoid a physical confrontation" with police. Id. at 595.
2000]
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that the officers were not bound to obtain warrants at the first practicable
moment.100 Therefore, the Court allowed the warrantless search because
the "exigency may arise at any time, and the fact that the police might
have obtained a warrant earlier does not negate the possibility of a
current situation's necessitating prompt police action."101 The Court
expanded the rule by deciding that exigent circumstances can exist in
more situations than just when the driver has been arrested.102
The confusion about the mobility/exigency requirement continued
in Texas v. White, 10 3 a 1975 case, in which the Court upheld a search of
the defendant's car after he was arrested.1 04 A majority of the Court
accepted the proposition that if officers were able to conduct a legal,
warrantless search of the automobile at the scene, they could also con-
duct a search of the automobile at the police station at a later time. 105
The White Court's justification for the warrantless search was based more
on the fact that the item to be searched was an automobile, rather than
the mobility of the item to be searched. 106 Thus, what began as an
exception to the warrant requirement, due to a concern with the fact that
contraband may be lost because it was in an automobile, 107 had evolved
into an almost automatic assumption of exigent circumstances simply
because an automobile was involved. 108
C. LESSER EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
While the courts continued to struggle with the meaning of the
mobility/exigency factor of the automobile exception, the second factor,
lesser expectation of privacy, was also developing.109 The Court began
to articulate the lesser expectation of privacy afforded to individuals
100. See id.
101. Id. at 595-96.
102. See id. at 595 ("[Eixigent circumstances with regard to vehicles are not limited to situations
where probable cause is unforeseeable and arises only at the time of arrest.").
103. 423 U.S. 67 (1975).
104. See Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 68 (1975). The defendant was arrested after attempting to
pass fraudulent checks at a drive-up window of a bank. See id.
105. See id. at 68 (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 300 U.S. 42, 52 (1970)); see also LAFAVE, supra
note 33, § 7.2(b), at 468.
106. See id.; see also LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2(b), at 468-69.
107. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158-59 (1925) (stating that a warrantless search
of an automobile is valid if based on probable cause to believe the automobile contains contraband).
108. See White, 423 U.S. at 69 (holding that an automobile may be searched later without obtain-
ing a warrant if there was probable cause to search at the time it was stopped). The White Court did
not mention mobility or exigency. See id.
109. See generally Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); see also LAFAVE, supra note 33
§ 7.2(b), at 467. The Court in Cady noted that originally the justification for treating automobiles
differently than houses was based on the mobile nature of automobiles, but the Court recognized that
the automobile exception was being applied to warrantless searches of vehicles in circumstances
where the possibility of the vehicle being removed or evidence in it destroyed was "remote, if not
non-existent." 413 U.S. at 441-42.
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while using a motor vehicle to transport their belongings1 I 10 In Cady v.
Dombrowski,Ill a 1973 case, the Court expanded the previously noted
differences in cars and homes by looking to the expectation of privacy
concerned with each."l 2 The fact that cars frequently came into contact
with local officials in situations where the officials were able to see
evidence of crimes or contraband in "plain view" justified, in the
Court's eyes, a lesser expectation of privacy.11 3 Therefore, the Court in
Cady noted that the constitutional difference between automobiles and
premises stemmed not only from the mobility of automobiles, but also
from the extensive, routine contact law enforcement officials have with
automobiles. 114
This lesser expectation of privacy justification was another basis for
the Court's holding in Cardwell.115 In Cardwell, the Court upheld a
search of an automobile's exterior under the automobile exception."l 6
The Court stated that a person has a lesser expectation of privacy in an
automobile because "its function is transportation and it seldom serves
as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects."' 17 The
Court indicated this lesser expectation of privacy would make a warrant-
less search, based upon probable cause, reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. 118
A familiar summation of the lesser privacy interest in automobiles is
found in South Dakota v. Opperman,"l9 decided in 1976:
Automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and
continuing governmental regulation and controls, including
periodic inspection and licensing requirements. As an every-
day occurrence, police stop and examine vehicles when license
plates or inspection stickers have expired, or if other violations,
such as exhaust fumes or excessive noise, are noted, or if
headlights or other safety equipment are not in proper working
order. 120
110. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2(b), at 469.
111. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
112. See Cady, 413 U.S. at 442 (defining the constitutional difference between houses and
automobiles).
113. See id. at 442.
114. See id.
115. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974).
116. See id. at 592.
117. Id. The Court further noted a "car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny" and
"travels public thoroughfares where the occupants and contents are in plain view." Id.
118. See id. at 592-93. The Court stated that with a "search" limited to the exterior of the car,
such as an examination of tire treads and the taking of paint scrapings, no privacy interests are
infringed upon. See id. at 591.
119. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
120. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976); accord LAFAVE, supra note 33,
20001
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Opperman concerned the validity of an inventory search. 121 The Court
referred to the reduced expectation of privacy in automobiles as
justification for the warrantless inventory search and held the search was
valid. 122
After Opperman, the Court defined the automobile exception to
allow warrantless searches of automobiles based upon the
mobility/exigency issues and the lesser expectation of privacy inherent
in automobiles.1 2 3 Thus, at this point, it was fairly well settled that
warrantless searches of automobiles based upon probable cause were
permitted.12 4 The next major issue facing the Court was the possible
extension of the automobile warrant exception to containers found
within an automobile.
D. SEARCH OF CONTAINERS FOUND WITHIN AUTOMOBILES
The question concerning the search of containers within a vehicle
was first addressed in 1977, in United States v. Chadwick.125 Federal
agents had received a tip from Amtrak employees concerning a suspi-
cious footlocker being shipped to Boston. 126 Once the train arrived in
Boston, agents observed two men claim the footlocker and load it into
the defendant's trunk.t 27 While the trunk of the car was still open, but
before the engine was started, the three men were arrested. 128 The
footlocker was seized and searched later at the Boston Federal
Building.129
The Court determined that the search was illegal because the law
enforcement officers should have obtained a search warrant for the
footlocker.1 30 The Court stated that the doctrines of mobility and
diminished expectation of privacy within the automobile exception did
§ 7.2(b), at 469.
121. See id. at 366-67. The car in question had been issued two parking tickets within a seven
hour period. See id. at 365-66. The first parking ticket explained that the car could be towed for the
violation. See id. at 365. After an officer issued the second ticket, the car was towed. See id. at 366.
After officers noticed a watch and other personal belongings inside the car, an officer conducted an
inventory of all the items in the car. See id. The officer used a standard inventory form pursuant to
standard police procedure. See id. The inventory revealed a plastic bag in the glove compartment
containing marijuana. See id.
122. See id. at 368.
123. See id.
124. See generally South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67
(1975); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Chambers
v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1971); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
125. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
126. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 3 (1977). The footlocker was unusually heavy
for its size and was leaking talcum powder, which was often used to mask the odor of marijuana or
hashish. See id.
127. See id. at 4.
128. See id.
129. See id. The search of the car disclosed no other evidence. See id. The keys for the foot-
locker were found on one of the defendants. See id.
130. See id. at 13.
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not apply to the footlocker.131 The Court reasoned that luggage, even
when contained in vehicles, was not the same as a vehicle itself.132 A
person's expectations of privacy in the items contained in personal
luggage are substantially greater than the expectations of privacy in an
automobile.133 The Court, therefore, concluded that once the footlocker
was seized, it was unreasonable to search it without first obtaining a
warrant. 134
Two years after Chadwick, the Court addressed another case involv-
ing luggage within a car. In Arkansas v. Sanders,135 police officers
responded to a tip that the defendant would arrive at the Little Rock
Municipal Airport carrying a green suitcase containing marijuana. 136
The defendant arrived at the designated airport with a green suitcase, and
the defendant and another man then hailed a taxi, put the green suitcase
in the taxi's trunk, and left the airport.137 The officers then pulled the
taxi over and asked the taxi driver to open the trunk. 138 The officers,
without the permission of the defendant or the other man, opened the
suitcase and discovered 9.3 pounds of marijuana.139
The Court in Sanders followed the rule set forth in Chadwick and
held that the search of the suitcase was unconstitutional. 140 The Court
stated that the fact the luggage was seized from an automobile did not
affect a person's expectation of privacy in the luggage.141 Therefore,
the two reasons for allowing a warrantless search of an automobile,
mobility and a lesser expectation of privacy, did not apply to searches of
personal luggage taken from automobiles.142 Thus, at this point, officers





134. See id. The Court noted that once the federal agents seized the footlocker, there was no
danger that it would be destroyed or its contents removed while a search warrant was obtained. See
id.
135. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
136. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 755 (1979). The officers were confident in the ac-




139. See id. The marijuana was packaged in 10 plastic bags. See id.
140. See id. at 763-64. The Court looked to Chadwick, in which the Court found the exigent
circumstances disappeared once the officers seized the luggage. See id. (citing United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977)).
141. See id. at 764-65. The Court in Sanders also noted that, as a general rule, there was no
greater need for warrantless searches of luggage simply because it was taken from an automobile.
See id.
142. See id. at 764-65.
143. See id. at 766.
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In 1982, the Court decided another case involving a container
within an automobile, United States v. Ross,144 a watershed case regard-
ing the warrant exception for automobile searches. 145 In Ross, the police
had probable cause to search the defendant's automobile for drugs. 146
The police found a "brown lunch bag" in the trunk. 147 Even though the
police did not have a search warrant, they opened the bag and found
smaller bags containing white powder.148 Police lab results determined
the white powder was heroin.149
The Court in Ross distinguished its holding from Chadwick and
Sanders, because of the presence of probable cause to search the entire
automobile, and found its position consistent with Chambers and
Carroll.150 The scope of a lawful search under the Chambers-Carroll
rule was broadened and defined in Ross. 151 The Court in Ross held that
"the scope of the warrantless search authorized by [the automobile]
exception is no broader and no narrower than a magistrate could
legitimately authorize by warrant." 1 52 Thus, if "probable cause justifies
the search- of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every
part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the
search." 1 53 The Court determined that the Carroll decision would be
essentially worthless if the scope of a warrantless search of an automobile
did not include other containers or packages found inside the
automobile. 154
144. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
145. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2(d), at 496 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798
(1982)).
146. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 801. The police had a detailed description of the defendant and his
car from a previously reliable informant. See id. at 800.
147. See id. at 801.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 818; see also LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2(d), at 493-94. In Chadwick, the police
only had probable cause to search the footlocker, see 433 U.S. at 13, and in Sanders, the police only
had probable cause to search the green suitcase, see 442 U.S. at 764-65. The Court determined the
facts of the current case were more in alignment with Carroll, where there was probable cause to
search the vehicle for contraband. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 813-14, 819 (citing Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925)).
151. See id. at 818; see also LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2(d), at 493. The Court specifically
framed the question before it as determining the scope of the exception created by Carroll. See Ross,
456 U.S. at 809.
152. Id. at 825; accord LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2(d), at 493.
153. Ross, 456 U.S. at 825; accord LAFAvE, supra note 33, § 7.2(d), at 493.
154. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 818. The Court in Ross reasoned that it would be illogical to assume
the quality of the container was the key to the validity of the search; the searches in Carroll and
Chambers would have been valid even if the whiskey in Carroll would have been found in a burlap




Commentators have stated that the decision in Ross was shaped by
two philosophies of the Court. 155 One view proposed that the automo-
bile exception should be narrowly drawn to show the judicial preference
for warrants, and the second view supported broadening the exceptions
to promote more effective law enforcement. 156 Commentators pointed
to the frequency of plurality opinions and five-to-four decisions as
evidence of the difficulty the Court had reconciling these two vastly
different philosophies.157
The final blow to the view preferring a warrant came in 1991, in
California v. Acevedo. 158 In Acevedo, officers were surveying an apart-
ment known to contain marijuana.159 The Supreme Court overruled the
Sanders case 160 and stated that not only had the Chadwick-Sanders rule
failed to adequately protect privacy interests, but it had also caused
confusion for both the courts and law enforcement officers. 161 The
Court articulated the new rule as follows: "The police may search an
automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause
to believe contraband or evidence is contained."I 62 Thus, after Acevedo,
it would seem the Court had created "one rule to govern all automobile
searches." 163
E. SEARCH OF PERSONS WITHIN AN AUTOMOBILE
Commentators have stated it is important to note that in dealing with
the search of automobiles and the containers within, persons inside the
automobile are subject to a different set of principles.1 64 The Court in
United States v. Di Re165 faced the question of whether an occupant of a
car could be searched if the items the officers were looking for could be
concealed on the person.166 The Court was not convinced that by one's
155. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2(d), at 496.
156. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2(d), at 496; see also Katz, supra note 31, at 601-02.
157. See Shepard, supra note 29, at 223 (citing Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)).
158. 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
159. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 567 (1991). The officers had intercepted a
package containing marijuana and arranged to have the package forwarded to a Federal Express
office so that they could arrest the person who claimed the package. See id.
160. See id. at 576-77 (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977); Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 770 (1979)).
161. See id. at 568-69. The Court stated the Chadwick-Sanders rule had also "impeded effective
law enforcement" and had been "criticized in the academic community." Id.
162. Id. at 580.
163. Id.
164. See LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 7.2(e), at 507.
165. 332 U.S. 581 (1947).
166. See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1947). The officers were looking for
counterfeit gasoline ration coupons and eventually found 100 coupons in an envelope concealed
between the defendant's shirt and underwear. See id. at 583.
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mere presence in a car, a person should lose the right to be immune
from searches of his or her body.167
Thus, it is from this winding and twisting road that the current
automobile exception emerged, which allows officers to search an
automobile and the containers within it when the officer has probable
cause to believe the contraband or evidence is inside the container. 168
Wyoming v. Houghton169 was the most recent fork in the road.1 70 The
Supreme Court was presented with the issue of what effect ownership of
the containers had on the automobile exception.171
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's decision in Houghton was divided six-to-
three.172 Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, 173 Justice Breyer filed
a concurrence, 174 and Justice Stevens authored the dissenting opinion.175
A. MAJORITY OPINION
The Court began by laying out a two-part test to determine whether
the government's action violated the Fourth Amendment. 176 The first
step required an inquiry as to whether the action was prohibited under
common law at the time the Fourth Amendment was framed.1 77 If the
first step did not produce an answer, the second step focused on the
traditional standard of reasonableness.178 The traditional standard of
reasonableness required a balancing of the degree to which the
governmental action intruded upon the individual's Fourth Amendment
rights, and the degree to which the action was needed for the support of
a legitimate governmental interest. 179
167. See id. The Court found no reason to expand the Carroll rule to justify the search of persons
merely because of their presence in an automobile. See id.
168. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991).
169. 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
170. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 297.
174. See id. at 307.
175. See id. at 309.
176. See id. at 299-300.
177. See id. (citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995); California v. Hodari D., 499
U.S. 621, 624 (1991) (defining seizure to mean "taking possession" or bringing an object under
physical control)).
178. See id. (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995) (defining the
traditional reasonableness test as a balancing of the intrusion of the search on an individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against the search's promotion of a legitimate governmental action)).
179. See id. at 297.
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1. Part I-Common Law Inquiry
The Court began its common law analysis by noting that the Wyo-
ming Highway Patrol Officers had probable cause to believe illegal
drugs were in the car. 180 The existence of probable cause to search for
contraband allowed the Court to analogize the current case to the Carroll
line of cases.181 The Carroll Court concluded that the framers would
have regarded a warrantless search for contraband as reasonable in light
of legislation enacted from 1789 to 1799.182
Beyond the Carroll case, the Court found further historical evidence
to show that the framers would have found a warrantless search of the
containers within an automobile acceptable.1 83 The Court looked to
Justice Stevens' opinion in Ross for this support. 184 The Ross Court had
observed that throughout history it had been assumed that a "lawful
search of an automobile would include a search of any container which
might conceal the object of the search."1 85
The Court next addressed the issue of ownership and found neither
Ross nor the cases that followed had qualified the automobile exception
with respect to ownership.186 The Court noted that there were no passen-
180. See id. at 300. The trial court held that the officer had probable cause to search the car and
all containers in the car that could hold the contraband. See id. at 298.
181. See id. (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (noting Carroll "involved the
warrantless search of a car [that police] had probable cause to believe contained contraband-.
bootleg liquor")).
182. See id. (citing Carroll, 267 U.S. at 150-53). The legislation to which the Court referred
"empowered customs officials to search any ship or vessel without a warrant if they had probable
cause to believe that it contained goods subject to a duty." Id.
183. See id. at 300.
184. See id. at 300-01 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820 n.26 (1982)).
185. Id. at 301 (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 820 n.26). The Ross Court observed:
It is noteworthy that the early legislation on which the Court relied in Carroll concerned
the enforcement of laws imposing duties on imported merchandise .... Presumably such
merchandise was shipped then in containers of various kinds, just as it is today. Since
Congress had authorized warrantless searches of vessels and beasts for imported
merchandise, it is inconceivable that it intended a customs officer to obtain a warrant for
every package discovered during the search; certainly Congress intended customs
officers to open shipping containers when necessary and not merely to examine the
exterior of cartons or boxes in which smuggled goods might be concealed. During
virtually the entire history of our country-whether contraband was transported in a
horse-drawn carriage, a 1921 roadster, or a modem automobile-it has been assumed
that a lawful search of a vehicle would include a search of any container that might
conceal the object of the search.
Id. at 300-01 (citing Ross, 433 U.S. at 820 n.26).
186. See id. at 301 (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 572 (1991) (stating that the Court
in Ross "took the critical step of saying that closed containers in cars could be searched without a
warrant because of their presence within the automobile"); United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478,
479-80 (1985) (stating Ross "held that if police officers have probable cause to search a lawfully
stopped vehicle, they may conduct a warrantless search of any containers found inside which may
contain the object of the search")).
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gers in Ross.187 However, the Court stated that if the Ross Court had
intended to limit its rule with respect to ownership, this substantial
limitation would have been expected to be expressed in the Ross
opinion. 188 Thus, the Court concluded there was no reason to believe
ownership limitations were implied in Ross. 189
The Court continued its historical analysis by stating that Hough-
ton's proposal requiring law enforcement officers to distinguish the
ownership of containers within an automobile was not consistent with the
balance of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 190 The Court framed the
critical element of permissible scope in terms of probable cause to
believe the specific thing being searched for is located in the area to be
searched, and whether this scope was limited by ownership of the
container. 19 1
The Court concluded that the historical evidence relied upon in
Ross did not distinguish containers based on ownership. 192 The Court
stated that "when there is probable cause to search for contraband in a
car . . . police officers . . . [may reasonably] examine packages and
containers without showing individualized probable cause for each
[package or container]." 193 Also, a passenger's personal belongings or
containers are the same as the driver's belongings or containers, even the
glove compartment, and are all "in" the car.194 Thus, the warrantless
search of Houghton's purse would have been permitted under common
law at the time the Fourth Amendment was framed.195
2. Part II-Traditional Reasonableness Balance
While the Court had satisfied its test by meeting the first part, it
nonetheless turned to the second part.196 The Court stated that an
examination of the traditional reasonableness balancing test also yielded
an answer in favor of upholding the search. 197 The Court weighed the
187. See id. (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 825).
188. See id. The Court further stated that such a limitation would have been expected to be
"apparent in the historical evidence forming the basis" for the Ross decision, but there was no mention
of ownership. Id. at 302 (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 825).
189. See id.
190. See id. at 302.
191. See id. (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 824). The Court also looked to an earlier Supreme Court
case in which the constitutionality of a search warrant was challenged because the warrant was
directed at a place owned by someone who was not suspected of the crime. See id. (citing Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978)).








degree to which the governmental action intruded upon individual
privacy against the degree to which the intrusion advanced legitimate
governmental interests. 198
The Court first turned to the lesser expectation of privacy afforded
to automobiles to determine the degree of intrusion on individual pri-
vacy interests. 199 The Court cited both Cardwell and Opperman and de-
cided that passengers, along with drivers, "possess a reduced expectation
of privacy" with regard to what they transport within automobiles. 200
The Court attacked the position taken by the Wyoming Supreme
Court concerning the reasonableness of the search. 20 1 The Wyoming
Supreme Court analyzed the search as if it were a search of a person,
instead of a search of a container.202 The Court agreed that searches of
individuals are subjected to a higher standard of protection, 203 but it
distinguished the current case by stating this heightened protection did
not apply to the examination of personal property found inside an
automobile. 204
At this point, the Court inserted a footnote chiding the dissent for its
analysis, which was based upon a distinction between drivers and passen-
gers. 205 The Court defended its position that there was a distinction
between an item concealed in clothing worn by a passenger and items
concealed in a passenger's personal belongings, such as a briefcase or a
purse. 206 The Court stated its distinction between searches of property
and searches of persons preserved an individual's privacy interests con-
cerning searches of the person. 207 The Court would allow searches of
property, such as personal belongings, within an automobile, but it would
disallow the search of a person. 208 The Court stated the traumatic
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. Id. (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
U.S. 583, 590 (1975)). The Court noted the observations made in Cardwell that cars "travel public
thoroughfares," and in Opperman, that cars "seldom serve as a repository for personal effects and are
subject to police stop and examination to enforce extensive automobile regulation," along with the fact
that traffic accidents may expose all of an automobile's contents to public scrutiny, as support for its
position. Id.
201. See id. at 303.
202. See id. The Court stated that the two cases relied upon by the Wyoming Supreme Court
focused on personal privacy and personal dignity and were not conclusive on the issue of the search
of a package. See id.
203. See id. (citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 96 (1979) (holding that a search warrant for a
tavern did not cover body searches of all patrons present when the warrant was executed); United
States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948) (holding that a "search of a car did not justify a body search
of a passenger")).
204. See id. at 303.
205. See id. at 303 n.l.
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consequences normally associated with searches of the person were not
expected during a search of an individual's personal belongings. 209
Next, the Court turned to the second part of the balancing test-the
degree to which the search is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.2 10 The majority described the governmental
interests at stake as substantial. 211 The Court stated that the effectiveness
of law enforcement would be substantially hindered by acceptance of the
Wyoming Supreme Court's rule.212 The Court then listed three factors
in favor of allowing the search: mobility, common enterprise, and a
passenger as an unknowing accomplice. 213
As support for the mobility concern, the Court cited California v.
Carney.214 In its decision, the Carney Court recited a litany of cases in
which the Supreme Court had relied upon the difference between
stationary structures and vehicles as justification for an exception to the
Fourth Amendment. 215 In light of the risks of losing evidence created
by the mobility of automobiles, the Houghton Court determined that the
governmental interest in allowing a warrantless search outweighed an
individual's privacy concerns. 2 16
The Court also recognized that a passenger may be engaged in a
common enterprise with the driver.217 In such a situation, the passenger
would have a personal interest in concealing contraband or other
evidence. 2 18 The Court looked to Maryland v. Wilson219 as support for
this proposition. 220 The Wilson decision extended an officer's authority
to request a driver to exit a car after a traffic stop to include allowing the
officer to request that passengers get out of the car too.221 The Hough-
ton Court noted that one reason for this rule would be to remove a
209. See id. at 303.
210. See id. at 299-300.
211. See id. at 304.
212. See id.
213. See id. at 304-05.
214. 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
215. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 304 (1999) (citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S.
386, 390-91 (1985) (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806 (1982); South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 582, 588 (1974); Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 442 (1973); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970); Cooper v.
California, 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967))).
216. See id. at 304 (stating that, as in all car search cases, the mobility of an automobile created a
risk that evidence would be lost while the warrant was obtained).
217. See id. at 304-05 (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413-14 (1997)).
218. See id.
219. 519 U.S. 408 (1997).
220. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 304-05 (1999) (citing Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413-14).
221. See Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413-14. The Court explained that this rule was based on concern
for the officer's safety. See id. at 413. For example, if a weapon were concealed in the car, a




barrier to an officer's search when the passengers were involved in a
crime with the driver. 222 Thus, the Court found a legitimate governmen-
tal interest in allowing a warrantless search of a passenger's belongings
because the passenger may be involved in the suspected crime.223
The Houghton Court noted the final reason supporting substantial
governmental interests concerned passengers who become "unwitting
accomplices." 224 The Court stated that a driver might have access to a
passenger's property for the purposes of concealing contraband as easi-
ly as other containers inside the car.225 The Court looked to Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 226 in which a defendant dumped drugs in a companion's
purse to evade detection by officers. 227 The Court analogized this situa-
tion to the current case because Houghton, as one of her defenses, pro-
posed that the contraband in her purse must have been placed there by
one of her traveling companions. 228
The Court acknowledged that these factors may not always be
present, but the balancing test required the weighing of general interests
versus specific case-by-case interests. 229 The Court stated that if officers
had to positively conclude that the driver and passenger were involved in
joint criminal activity or believe that the driver had time and opportunity
to conceal the objects within the passenger's belongings, a passenger's
property would virtually never be searched. 230 The majority anticipated
that once this "passenger's property" rule became widely known,
drivers and passengers involved in joint criminal activity would pass off
all belongings in the car as the passenger's, and enormous amounts of
litigation would ensue. 231
The Court stated that the subsequent litigation would not only be
voluminous, it would also be extremely complicated. 232 The "passen-
ger's property" rule would require courts to resolve several questions,
222. See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 305. The Court stated that if it were to impose a requirement that
the police could not search passenger's containers, then a criminal could hide contraband in those
containers. See id.
223. See id. at 304-05.
224. See id. at 305 (citing Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 102 (1980)).
225. See id.
226. 338 U.S. 98 (1980).
227. See Rawlings, 338 U.S. at 100-01. Officers were executing a search warrant at a premises
where Rawlings was a visitor. See id. One of the residents of the house was asked to empty her
purse; she told Rawlings to, "take what is yours" when she dumped several types of illegal drugs out of
her purse. See id.
228. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 305 (1999). The Court noted that Houghton
"testified that most of the seized contraband must have been placed in her purse by traveling
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including whether: (1) the officer should have believed the passenger's
ownership claims; (2) the officer should have concluded the passenger
owned the items based on objective factors; (3) the officer had reason to
believe the driver and passenger were involved in joint criminal activity;
and (4) the driver may have ensnared the passenger as an unknowing
accomplice by concealing items in passenger's belongings without the
passenger's permission. 233
Here, the Court again responded to the dissent in a footnote. 234
According to the Court, the dissent placed its confidence in a police
officer's ability to know what items were "obviously" owned by the
passengers. 235 The Court rebutted by stating, "[I]t seems not at all
obvious precisely what constitutes obviousness," and thus, the protection
provided by the dissent was "unclear and unadministrable." 236
The Court determined that after consideration of the government's
interests involved, the balancing test tipped in favor of allowing the
search of a passenger's belongings. 237 The Court stated that the interests
advanced by the government were great, while the personal privacy
interests were weak. 238
The Court then considered the possible exception to the automobile
exception set forth by the Wyoming Supreme Court.239 The Court
rejected this exception. 240  The Court concluded that the distinction
between passengers and any other person whose property may have been
in the car was not reasonable. 241 The Court stated this distinction would
provide greater protection for owners of property who are passengers
and lesser protection for those who are not. 242 The Court concluded that
the issue was not the ownership of the container, but rather that the
container was found inside an automobile for which there was probable
cause to search for contraband. 243
233. See id. at 305-06.
234. See id. at 306 n.2.
235. See id.
236. Id. (characterizing the dissent's protection of passenger's privacy interests as "on-the-
cheap").
237. See id. at 306 (noting that when balancing the competing interests to determine reasonable-
ness, the Court must take account of practical realities).
238. See id.
239. See id. The Wyoming Supreme Court's rule required officers to determine the ownership of
containers within an automobile. See State v. Houghton, 956 P.2d 363, 372 (Wyo. 1998). After
determining ownership, then the officers could only search the containers belonging to people the
officers suspected of criminal activity. See id.
240. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 306 (1999).
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. See id. at 307 ("The sensible rule (and the rule supported by history and caselaw) is that
such a package may be searched, whether or not its owner is present as a passenger or otherwise,
because it may contain the contraband that the officer has reason to believe is in the car.").
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Thus, the rule created by the majority focused on the location of the
property, rather than ownership. 244  The majority held that "officers
with probable cause to search a car may inspect passengers' belongings
found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the
search."245
B. JUSTICE BREYER'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Breyer concurred in the majority's decision but pointed out
its limitations. 246 He stated that historical analysis is important, but it
should not be determinative of whether a Fourth Amendment violation
has occurred. 247 He agreed that requiring officers to establish a contain-
er's ownership would destroy the bright-line rule set forward in Ross.248
He also stated that in several cases the officer would have probable cause
to search all containers, even those of the passengers.249 Thus, Justice
Breyer reasoned that allowing the search of all containers, regardless of
ownership, would authorize only a limited number of searches that
would otherwise be prohibited.250
Justice Breyer further stated that the rule of Houghton applies only
to automobile searches and does not extend to a search of the person
found in the automobile. 251 Justice Breyer agreed that the majority was
correct in characterizing the distinction created in Di Re regarding
searches of a person, even including outer clothing, as different from
searches of containers. 252  Thus, Justice Breyer concurred that the
decision reached by the majority did not disturb the "significantly
heightened protection" afforded searches of a person. 253
Justice Breyer also pointed out another distinction that could be
made in the future. 254 He noted that the item at issue here was a wom-
an's purse, an article that often holds very personal items. 255 Justice
Breyer seemed to differentiate between a purse lying on the back seat
244. See id.
245. Id.
246. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
247. See id.
248. See id. at 307-08 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (holding that if
probable cause justified the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justified the search of every part
of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search)).
249. See id. at 307.
250. See id. at 308.
251. See id. (stating that the rule "'obviously' applies only to searches of automobiles").
252. See id. (citing United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 586-87 (1948)).
253. See id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968)).
254. See id. (finding it was important that the container in question was a woman's purse).
255. See id.
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from a purse that may be attached to the person. 256 In the latter case, he
argued this circumstance could change the search from a search of
property into the search of a person. 257 However, because those were not
the circumstances faced in this case, Justice Breyer concurred with the
majority. 258
C. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT
Justice Stevens, writing a dissent joined by Justice Souter and Justice
Ginsburg, framed the issue as a matter of ownership rather than a matter
of containers. 259 Justice Stevens reasoned that because the driver provid-
ed the information prompting the search, the passengers were not
individually suspect. 260 Justice Stevens relied upon Di Re for the prem-
ise that the exception to the warrant requirement does not apply to
passengers and subsequently to their belongings.2 61 He criticized the
majority for "fashioning a new rule that [was] based on the distinction
between property contained in clothing worn by a passenger and proper-
ty contained in a passenger's briefcase or purse." 262 Justice Stevens
further stated that, in either case, the property was still in a container,
regardless of whether the container was a purse or a pocket. 263 He also
stated that an intrusion into a purse or briefcase was just as serious as an
intrusion into a passenger's pockets. 264
Aside from his criticisms of the majority's analysis of Di Re, Justice
Stevens also criticized the majority's interpretation of Ross.265 He noted
that Ross rejected the notion that the scope of a search is defined by the
nature of the containers to be searched.2 66 Rather, Ross defined the
search in terms of the object of the search and where those items may be
256. See id. (stating that if a purse were attached to a person then the purse may "amount to a
kind of 'outer clothing').
257. See id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968)).
258. See id. (stating that when a purse was separate from a person, no one had claimed that the
type of container made a difference).
259. See id. at 309 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that in all of the prior cases
concerning the automobile exception, either the defendant was the operator of the automobile and had
custody of the item of the search, or no questions were raised as to ownership or custody. See id.
260. See id.
261. See id. at 309 (stating that in United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948), the only
automobile exception case concerning the search of a passenger, the Court held the exception to the
warrant requirement did not apply).
262. Id. at 309-10.
263. See id. at 310.
264. See id. (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985) (noting that school children
often carry highly personal items on their person or in purses); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733
(1877) (discussing the privacy of a person's papers while in the mail)).




concealed. 267 The Ross Court stated that probable cause to search a
taxi's trunk did not justify a search of the entire taxi, but the current
majority's rule would discard that notion and allow an entire search of
the taxi.2 68 Thus, Justice Stevens argued that the majority's rule was not
consistent with the rule set out by the Court in Ross.269
Next, Justice Stevens indicated that mere spatial associations were
not sufficient to warrant an intrusion into a passenger's privacy inter-
ests. 270 He stated that even if there was not individualized suspicion
toward Houghton, the officer should have at least had probable cause to
search her purse because it obviously did not belong to the driver. 271 He
also deferred to the Wyoming Supreme Court's determination that there
was not probable cause to search Houghton's purse.272
Justice Stevens also disputed the majority's determination that the
governmental interests presented in the case outweighed the individual's
privacy rights. 273 Justice Stevens stated that he was confident an officer
would be able to apply the rule set forth by the Wyoming Supreme
Court, which required a warrant or individualized probable cause to
search belongings obviously owned by passengers. 274 He argued that
the rule adopted by the majority was no less complicated than the one
proposed by the Wyoming Supreme Court, and thus it would be better to
adopt the Wyoming Supreme Court's rule because it afforded individu-
als more protection. 275
Justice Stevens closed by stating that the expansion given to the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement was based solely on the
267. See id. (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 825 (holding that every part of the vehicle and its contents
that may conceal the object of the search may be searched)).
268. See id. (stating that the rule fashioned by the majority would allow the search of a taxi cab
passenger's briefcase if there was probable cause to believe the taxi driver had contraband
somewhere in his vehicle).
269. See id.
270. See id. at 311 n.2; see also Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997) (emphasizing the
need for individualized suspicion); United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77, 82 (1993) (stating that persons
involved in a conspiracy did not automatically have lessened privacy interests); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444
U.S. 85, 91, 94-96 (1979) (explaining that a person's mere association to persons suspected of crime
did not create probable cause to search that person); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948)
(holding that mere presence in a suspected automobile did not result in losing immunity from
unreasonable searches of a person).
271. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 311 (1999).
272. See id.
273. See id. In a footnote, Justice Stevens charged the Court with inventing a new approach to
Fourth Amendment analysis. See id. at n.3. The Court had now put the traditional balancing test of
competing privacy and governmental interests in second place to a new analysis. See id. The Court
stated that it would only apply the balancing test if 18th-century common law did not provide an
answer to the Fourth Amendment issue. See id. Justice Stevens argued that this restrictive two-step
approach was not supported by precedent. See id.
274. See id.
275. See id. at 309, 312.
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driver's misconduct instead of on solid Fourth Amendment princi-
ples.276 He was thankful that the majority's holding was limited to the
automobile exception, but that limitation did not justify the
conclusion. 277
IV. IMPACT
Since the Houghton decision, its holding has been examined
multiple times. The United States Supreme Court has had an oppor-
tunity to review its decision. Many courts of several levels and of various
states have adopted and expanded the Houghton decision. Yet other
courts have rejected the Houghton decision in similar, but not identical,
circumstances. North Dakota is one of many states that has not yet had
an opportunity to apply or interpret Houghton. Along with various
courts, many members of the academic community have commented on
the Houghton decision.
A. AFFIRMING HOUGHTON
The United States Supreme Court had an opportunity to reaffirm
the approach to Fourth Amendment cases that it articulated in Houghton,
only a little over a month after its decision in Houghton. In Florida v.
White,278 the Court examined the validity of an inventory search. 279 The
majority opinion, written by Justice Thomas, applied the same historical
analysis used in the Houghton opinion: "In deciding whether a chal-
lenged governmental action violates the Amendment, we have taken care
to inquire whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search and
seizure when the Amendment was framed." 280 At this point, it seemed
that Houghton not only clarified the automobile exception, but it also
articulated the standard under which questions of Fourth Amendment
violations would be analyzed. 281
The Wyoming Supreme Court has also had an opportunity to com-
ment on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Houghton.282
The Wyoming Supreme Court characterized the United States Supreme
276. See id. at 313.
277. See id.
278. 526 U.S. 559 (1999).
279. See Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 562 (1999). The defendant's car was seized under a
forfeiture statute that allowed for the seizure of a vehicle used in the trafficking of illegal drugs. See
id. at 561 & n.2. Following the seizure, the government performed an inventory search and found
cocaine in the car. See id. at 562.
280. Id. at 563 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999)).
281. See id.
282. See Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 482 (Wyo. 1999).
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Court's decision as "virtually eliminating the 'closed container' analysis
from automobile exception searches." 283 The Wyoming Supreme Court
continued by stating that the view the United States Supreme Court took
eliminated warrant protection for automobile searches. 284
B. CASES FOLLOWING AND EXPANDING HOUGHTON
Some cases have applied the precedent set forth in Houghton, and
in some instances have expanded its holding. The California Court of
Appeals applied the Houghton decision to another case involving the
search of a woman's purse. 285 In People v. Hart,286 a law enforcement
officer searched the defendant's purse for her identification after she
refused to produce it.287 The defendant attempted to locate her purse
and her identification in the van but was unable to find it.288 At this
point the deputy began to fear for his safety and placed the two occu-
pants of the van into the backseat of his car.289
The officer searched the van looking for possible weapons and
other persons and found the defendant's purse in the back of the van. 290
Inside the purse, the officer found the defendant's identification along
with illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia. 291 The California Court of
Appeals followed the rule set forth in Houghton and determined that the
officer's search of the van for the purpose of retrieving the defendant's
identification did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 292 This case
applied the rule of Houghton to a situation where the law enforcement
officer was not looking for any type of contraband. 293
In State v. Matejka,294 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals declined to
differentiate a search based on probable cause from a search based on
consent, for purposes of applying the Houghton rule. 295 In Matejka, a
Wisconsin state trooper stopped a van for failure to display a license
plate on the front of the vehicle. 296 The defendant was a passenger in
283. Id. at481 &n.i.
284. See id. at 482.
285. See People v. Hart, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 762, 769 (Cal. App. 3d 1999).
286. 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 762 (Cal. App. 3d 1999).
287. See Hart, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 764. The Sheriffs Department had received a call concerning
a suspicious van parked in a residential neighborhood, and when the officers arrived on the scene, the
defendant did not reveal her identification. See id. at 763-64.
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. See id. at 764.
291. See id
292. See id. at 768 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999)).
293. See generally id.
294. No. 99-0070-CR, 1999 WL 682414 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 1999).
295. State v. Matejka, No. 99-0070-CR, 1999 WL 682414, at *5 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 1999).
296. See id. at * 1.
2000] 969
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
the van. 297 After giving the driver a warning for the violation, the troop-
er asked if there was anything illegal in the van, to which the driver
responded that there was not.298 The driver then consented to a search
of the van. 299 The trooper asked the occupants of the van to exit the
vehicle before he conducted the search. 300 Because of the weather con-
ditions, the passengers asked for their jackets. 301 The trooper searched
each jacket as he handed them to the passengers and found marijuana in
the pocket of the coat belonging to the defendant.302
The defendant argued that the driver of the van was not authorized
to give consent to the trooper to search her jacket. 303 The Wisconsin
Court of Appeals rejected this argument and interpreted the rule from
Houghton as allowing a driver to consent to the search of all the contain-
ers, regardless of ownership, in the driver's vehicle. 304 Thus, Matejka
declined to distinguish Houghton based on consent to search rather than
probable cause to search. 305
Another case which has applied the rule set forth in Houghton was
State v. Hirning,306 a South Dakota Supreme Court opinion. This case
involved another traffic stop where illegal drugs were discovered. 307 The
vehicle in question was stopped because of an object dangling from the
rearview mirror, which was a violation of South Dakota law.308 As he
approached the car, the officer noticed the passenger in the front seat
concealing an object underneath the seat. 309 At this point, the officer
feared for his safety, and he removed all the passengers from the car to
search under the front seat. 310 The search revealed a container with mari-
juana and methamphetamine inside. 311 The officer asked the driver who







303. See id. at *2.
304. See id. at *5.
305. See id. (stating that the Supreme Court in Houghton determined that a search "pursuant to a
valid consent is constitutionally permissible," and it allowed a search of "all compartments of the
vehicle, including a passenger's belongings found in the car").
306. 592 N.W.2d 600, 604-05 (S.D. 1999).
307. See State v. Hirning, 592 N.W.2d 600, 602 (S.D. 1999).






to basically all of them." 312 This admission lead to a search of all the
passengers, which revealed other contraband. 313
The South Dakota Supreme Court determined that once the driver
admitted the drugs belonged "to all of them," the officer had probable
cause to search the car. 314 The Court referred to Houghton when recog-
nizing that passengers and drivers are often involved in the common
enterprise of concealing fruits of their wrongdoing. 315 The Court con-
cluded that the "all-embracing admission" by the driver created particu-
larized suspicion to justify the search of each passenger. 316 Thus, the
South Dakota Supreme Court upheld the search. 317
The South Dakota Supreme Court once again cited to the Houghton
decision in State v. Steele. 318 When the officer searched the purse, he
found methamphetamine residue in two plastic bags. 319 Steele also
involved the search of a woman's purse. 320 A police officer pulled over
a vehicle, in which Steele was a passenger, for speeding. 321 After the
stop, the officer arrested the driver for driving under the influence of
alcohol, and the officer subsequently determined that Steele was unable
to drive the car because she was also intoxicated. 322 The officer pro-
ceeded to search the vehicle. 323 As she was leaving the car, the officer
requested Steele to leave her purse on the seat of the car.324 Steele-
appealed her conviction, alleging that the search of her purse was
unconstitutional. 325
The South Dakota Supreme Court determined that since the purse
was a container "in" the car, it was subject to a search similar to all other
containers. 326 While the search in Steele was subsequent to an arrest,
rather than based on probable cause, it reinforced the Houghton decision
that all containers within a car were subject to search when the car was
searched. 327
312. See id.
313. See id. The passenger in the back seat had four baggies of methamphetamine in his pockets,
and a search of the vehicle uncovered drug paraphernalia, a .22 caliber pistol, ammunition, a
"Kershaw" knife, and an M80 firecracker. See id.
314. See id. at 604.
315. See id. at 605 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999)).
316. See id.
317. See id.
318. 613 N.W.2d 825 (S.D. 2000).
319. See id.
320. See State v. Steele, 613 N.W.2d 825, 825-26 (S.D. 2000).





326. See id. at 830.
327. See id.
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A recent Nebraska case also applied the ruling from Houghton and
interpreted the reasoning of Houghton to be valid in a search incident to
an arrest context. 328 State v. Ray329 concerned the validity of a search of
a defendant's knapsack found within a car, in which the defendant had
been a passenger, after the car was searched subsequent to the driver's
arrest. 330 In rejecting the argument that the search of the knapsack was
illegal, the Nebraska Court of Appeals cited to Houghton and stated that
its reasoning-that ownership of the container was not relevant-was also
applicable in search incident to arrest cases. 331
A pair of companion cases from Texas also followed the rule set
forth in Houghton.332 The cases involved a search of a vehicle following
a stop for a seat belt violation. 333 When the officer approached the car,
he smelled burnt marijuana coming from the car. 334 The officer then
placed the driver in handcuffs and requested that the passenger get out
of the car. 335 After failing to find any marijuana in the passenger
compartment, the officer requested the keys for the trunk and found a
burlap bag containing twelve blocks of green marijuana. 336 The officer
then proceeded to search the passenger's purse and found drug para-
phernalia and a small amount of marijuana. 337
Both the passenger and the driver contended that the officer was
limited in the scope of his search to the passenger compartment because
the odor of burnt marijuana was coming from the passenger compart-
ment. 338 The Texas Court of Appeals rejected this argument, quoted
Houghton, and determined that once there was probable cause to search
the vehicle, the officer could examine all the contents of the car in both
the passenger compartment and the trunk. 339 Thus, the Texas Court of
Appeals used the Houghton decision to allow a search not only of the
passenger compartment of an automobile, but of the trunk as well.340
328. See State v. Ray, 609 N.W.2d 390, 396-97 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000).
329. 609 N.W.2d 390 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000).
330. See Ray, 609 N.W.2d at 393.
331. See id. at 397.
332. See Gallegos v. State, No. 05-95-00772-CR, 1999 WL 463369 (Tex. Ct. App. July 9, 1999);
Newman v. State, No. 05-95-00773-CR, 1999 WL 463371 (Tex. Ct. App. July 9, 1999).




337. See id. A later search revealed even more marijuana in the trunk; in total, thirty-nine pounds
of marijuana were found in the car. See id.
338. See id. at *2.





However, not all courts have agreed with each other on the applica-
tion of the Houghton decision. The Indiana Court of Appeals, in State
v. Friedel,34 1 ruled that if a search was based on consent rather than
probable cause, the law enforcement official would not be allowed to
search a passenger's belongings. 342 The decision was premised on the
idea that a driver does not have authority to give consent to a search of
his or her passenger's belongings. 343
In Friedel, a police officer stopped a vehicle for operating with only
one working headlight. 344 The officer ran a check of the driver and
found that he had an extensive criminal history, but the check revealed
no current outstanding warrants for the driver. 345 The officer then called
for back-up and asked the driver if he could search the automobile. 346
The driver consented to the search. 347 While conducting the search, the
officer found a black purse on the floor behind the seat where the defen-
dant had been sitting.348 The officer searched the defendant's purse
without her consent and found methamphetamine and marijuana.349
The defendant contested the search of her purse based on the consent
given by the driver to search the automobile. 350
The Indiana Court of Appeals began its analysis by applying the
test set forth in Houghton-looking to whether the search would have
been regarded as unlawful at the time the Fourth Amendment was
framed and then looking to the balance between the degree to which the
search intruded on an individual's privacy and the degree to which the
search was needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests. 35 1 However, the court concluded that the outcome of Hough-
ton was not dispositive in the current case because the officer in
Houghton had probable cause to search the vehicle, while in Friedel the
officer was searching only because the driver had given consent.3 52 The
Indiana Appellate Court determined that the real issue in the case was
341. 714 N.E.2d 1231, 1243 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
342. See State v. Friedel, 714 N.E.2d 1231, 1243 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
343. See id. at 1241 (citing United States v. Jaras, 86 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 1996)).
344. See id.
345. See id
346. See id. at 1234-35.




351. See id. at 1237 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999)).
352. See id. at 1238.
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whether the consent given by the driver was valid concerning the passen-
ger's purse, and the court decided it was not valid. 35 3 Thus, the Indiana
court determined that the consent of a driver to search does not auto-
matically trigger the same scope of search allowed under Houghton's
probable cause search. 354
D. IMPACT ON NORTH DAKOTA CASE LAW
The Houghton case may affect the future interpretation and appli-
cation of a 1993 North Dakota case. In State v. Gilberts,355 the North
Dakota Supreme Court articulated a rule very similar to the rule the
Wyoming Supreme Court created.356 Specifically, the court held that the
search and seizure of a passenger's jacket following the arrest of the
driver was an unjustifiable invasion of a passenger's rights,357 when the
driver was arrested for a criminal traffic violation, 358 and the officer had
no reason to believe the driver had concealed contraband or weapons
within the passenger's jacket.359
The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that since the officer knew
the jacket belonged to the passenger, and not to the driver, the officer
was not allowed to search the jacket.360 The North Dakota Supreme
Court used the same reasoning as the Wyoming Supreme Court by
finding that there was not an articulable suspicion related to the
passenger. 361 Since the officer had no reason to believe the jacket con-
tained contraband, the officer could not search it.362
The Gilberts decision leaves the automobile searches rule at a
crossroads in North Dakota.363 If the North Dakota Supreme Court had
the benefit of the Houghton decision at the time that it decided Gilberts,
there is no guarantee the Houghton decision would have been
controlling. 364 The North Dakota Supreme Court could have followed
the majority rule of Houghton and allowed the search without
consideration of ownership. 365 But the North Dakota Supreme Court
353. See id. at 1243 (holding that the driver did not have actual or apparent authority to consent to
the search of the passenger's purse).
354. See id. at 1238.
355. 497 N.W.2d 93 (N.D. 1993)
356. See State v. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d 93, 97 (N.D. 1993).
357. See id. at 99.
358. See id. at 94. The officer arrested the driver for driving with a suspended license. See id.
359. See id. at 97.
360. See id.
361. See id.
362. See id. at 99.
363. See id. (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring).
364. See id.
365. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999)
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could have just as easily ignored the Houghton rule because a search of
a passenger's jacket could be considered a search of the passenger's
person, a situation in which Houghton does not apply. 366 Finally, the
North Dakota Supreme Court could have justified the same decision it
reached in Gilberts by finding that the search violated the state
constitution.367
E. ACADEMIC COMMENTARY
Aside from judicial opinions, others have commented on the
decision in Houghton. An article written for the Harvard Law Review
analyzed the most recent Fourth Amendment cases, including Houghton,
and concluded that the Supreme Court's current trend toward expanding
the automobile exception is restricting the constitutional right to
travel. 368 Another academic journal characterized Houghton as a trend
to clarify Fourth Amendment cases for the benefit of law enforce-
ment. 369 Others have determined that the narrowing of individuals'
rights has been a direct result of the war on drugs. 370 One periodical
stated that the Houghton decision has continued the confusion concern-
ing the need for warrants to search containers by noting that containers
in automobiles usually do not require warrants but that containers
outside of automobiles usually require warrants. 371 Finally, another
authority has recognized that the Fourth Amendment analysis standard
articulated by the Court in Houghton is different from previous
standards because of the addition of the historical perspective. 372
F. UNRESOLVED ISSUE-PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
The amicus briefs foreshadowed the issue concerning application of
the Houghton decision to public transportation. The brief filed by the
366. See id. at 308 (Breyer, J., concurring).
367. See State v. Parker, 987 P.2d 73, 90 (Wash. 1999).
368. See Search and Seizure-Automobile Exception-Search of Passengers' Belongings, 113
HARV. L. REV. 255, 262 (1999).
369. See generally Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie, Bright-line Rules: Development of the Law of
Search and Seizure During Traffic Stops, 31 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 1 (1999).
370. See generally David Lawrence Burnett, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments-Search and
Seizure-Police Officers with Probable Cause to Search an Automobile May Inspect Passenger's Be-
longings that are Found in the Car, Which are Capable of Concealing the Object of the Search, Even
Without Reasonable Belief that the Passenger was Engaged in a Common Enterprise or that the Driver
Had Time to Conceal Items-Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297 (1999), 9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J.
1173 (1999).
371. See Craig M. Bradley, Whittling Away the Search Warrant Requirement, 35 TRIAL 85, 86
(June 1999).
372. See Kathryn R. Urbonya, Supreme Courts 1998-1999 Term: Fourth Amendment Decisions
219 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course, Handbook Series No. HO-0044, Oct. 1999).
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National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (Defense Lawyers)
expressed concern with what should happen in situations involving
taxicabs and other forms of public transportation. 373 In its brief, the
Defense Lawyers set forth the following hypothetical:
Suppose, for instance, the police stop a taxicab occupied by a
lawyer on the way to court. . . . [I]f the officer spied a
syringe in the driver's pocket, the police could search a law-
yer's briefcase even though the lawyer had no relationship to
the driver and had done nothing suspicious. 374
The Defense Lawyers characterized the rule eventually adopted in
Houghton as forcing individuals to "forfeit their Fourth Amendment
rights every time they step into an automobile driven by another
person." 375
Along a similar vein, the Legal Aid Association's brief pointed to situa-
tions involving limousines and car pools. 37 6  The brief set forward
situations involving chauffeurs possessing drugs as well as carpooling
circumstances where a member of the carpool may not be aware of
illegal substances carried by fellow carpool members. 377 The cases since
Houghton have yet to contain factual circumstances similar to these
hypotheticals and, as a result, at this time it is difficult to determine if the
fears of the amici will come to fruition.
V. CONCLUSION
At first it may have appeared that the Court created a bright-line
rule in Houghton: When there is probable cause to search an auto-
mobile, all containers inside it may be searched. 378 However, a closer
examination revealed that at least one issue was left unresolved. 379 With
at least one issue unresolved, the Houghton decision seems destined to
become another case along the winding road of cases interpreting the
application of the Fourth Amendment to automobiles.
Kari M. Knudson*
373. See Brief of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers at 16-17, Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) (No. 98-184).
374. See id. at 17.
375. See id. at 17-18.
376. See Brief of the Legal Aid Society of New York City and the National Legal Aid and
Defender Association at 14, Houghton (No. 98-184).
377. See id.
378. See Major Walter M. Hudson, A Few New Developments in the Fourth Amendment, ARMY
LAW., Apr. 1999, at 25, 37.
379. See supra Part IV.F.
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